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REACTIONS OF A LAWYER-NEWLY BECOME JUDGE
HENRY J. FRIENDLYt
JUDGE Cardozo brought to the Storrs lectures a deathless mind and spirit,
eight extraordinarily fruitful years on an appellate bench, and a life that had
been devoted to philosophy, jurisprudence and reflection. That slender volume
has had the greatest impact on American legal thinking of any book since
Holmes' Lowell lectures, delivered exactly forty years before; after four de-
cades, every reading yields new apercus and we are still under its spell.
Against that contribution it is difficult to imagine what useful comments on
judges and judging can be made by a most ordinary mortal who, when most
of this article was written, had barely as many months on the bench as Car-
dozo then had years and whose life has been passed in the dust of the market-
place rather than on the high Alpine meadows where Cardozo dwelt.1 How-
ever, such a flattering invitation from so distinguished a source could not be
refused-although prudence would surely have dictated that the 1959 judicial
vintage be kept longer in the cellar, with the more delectable growths of that
year.
I.
What strikes a practicing lawyer on becoming a judge of an important
appellate court? In the case of this one, primarily two things.
The first is the enormous change in the effect of the simple act of signing
his name. He does something he has done thousands of times without any
great consequences attaching to it; then, suddenly, at least if his signature is
accompanied by colleagues', "the whole power of the state will be put forth,
if necessary, ' 2 to carry out his will.
This power of deciding between one's fellow men is, indeed, a responsibility
that is awful in the etymological sense and must call forth a deep sense of
humility. The awe, and the humility, ought to persist despite some considera-
tions that might be urged as detracting from them. It is, of course, a common-
place that human experience has devised no better method of settling contro-
versies than to submit them to men who, hopefully at least, are disinterested,
experienced and wise, and then require that the decisions of those men be
tUnited States Circuit Judge, 2d Circuit.
1. For a single sentence summary one can hardly improve on the remark of Judge
Cuthbert W. Pound:
The judge should no doubt, like our own great Chief judge, be both lawyer and
philosopher of the highest grade, blessed with saving common sense and practical
experience as well as sound and comprehensive learning, but such men are rare.
Pound, Defective Law-Its Cause and Remedy, 1 BuLu. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'WN 279, 285
(1929).
2. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in CoLLEcrn LEGAL PAPERs 167 (1920).
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accepted, whether acceptable or not. Though this process assuredly is "one
of the greatest triumphs mankind has won in its recorded history,"' it is a
triumph common to all mature legal systems. True also, our judges decide
controversies, not like St. Louis under the oak tree,4 but by applying the rule
of law. Still we should not cease to marvel at the process, and current hap-
penings in our own land, best here left undescribed, show it may not have
been altogether realized even yet.5
More enduringly impressive to the lawyer-turned-appellate-judge are the
reverberations of his judgments beyond their immediate context. The decisions
of our judges-and this is where they differ from the arbitrator, the jury,
and, to a considerable extent, from their counterparts under other legal sys-
tems 6-not only determine the case for the litigants, but help, in greater or
less degree, to "make law" for thousands of others. "In the instance the suits
are controlled by the rules; in the aggregate the rules are determined by the
suits." 7 The practitioner, whose legal views were of interest only to a few
clients, and of little enough to them, dons a robe. Suddenly he becomes a
legislator exercising power over generations yet unborn-a legislator dealing
with many subjects as to which he has little familiarity, chosen without any
real knowledge by the people that he will exert any such power, and fiercely
resisting any effort by them to control him, although, in most areas, subject
to reversal by the elected legislature if it should decide to intervene. This
power is his, if he be sufficiently persuasive, even if a colleague thinks other-
wise; "All agree that there may be dissent when the opinion is filed. Some
would seem to hold that there must be none a moment thereafter. Plenary in-
spiration has then descended upon the work of the majority."8
II.
Surely the choice to have vast portions of our laws thus made by "a body
who are specialists only in being unspecialized" 9-if choice it can be said to
have been '°--was not inevitable, nor is it today. It is not that codification is
any real alternative; one need not go beyond the framers of the first great
3. Oppenheimer, First Judicial Impressions, 46 A.B.A.J. 1188 (1960) (relating to the
role of the trial judge).
4. See POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHUrosoPHy OF LAW 63 (1925).
5. See McGill, A View From a Tight Small Compartment, Harv. Law School Bull.,
June 1961, p. 6; 1 DAvis, ADmiNisTRATIvE LAW 56 (1958).
6. See VON MEaREN, THE CIvIL LAw SysTEm 827-28, 945-50 (1957); Pound, The
Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARv. L. REv. 940 (1923). For a different view with
respect to precedent under the civil law, see FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 295 (1944), and
generally, the references cited by Judge Frank in Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434,
439 nn.8, 9 & 11 (2d Cir. 1949).
7. Hamilton, Judicial Process, in 8 ENcYc. Soc. Scr. 450 (1932).
8. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 29 (1921).
9. LLEWVELLYN, THE ComON LAW T aDrToN: DEcIDING APPEALS 263 (1960).
10. The development is conveniently summarized in PLUcKNM, A CoNcIsE HIsToRY
OF THE CoImmoN LAW 342-50 (5th ed. 1956).
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modern code for recognition that "the needs of society are so varied, the inter-
course among humans so active, their interests so multiple, and their relation-
ships so extensive that it is impossible for the legislator to foresee everything"
and that "a code, however complete it may appear, is no sooner promulgated
than a thousand unexpected questions are presented to the judge."" But it
is a fair question, at least on an academic basis, whether, with the immense
broadening of the scope and intricacies of law, we would not do better to leave
its development to those whose learning is a fact rather than a polite, or
occasionally a sarcastic, phrase. I do not mean by this that law teachers are
generically superior to lawyers-who-have-become-judges, although I should
think few courts could sustain comparison, man to man, with the faculties of
our best law schools and, in law that was made by professors rather than
judges, only the best would count. My point is rather that whereas it was not
unreasonable to expect a judge to be truly learned in a body of law that Black-
stone compressed into 2400 pages, it is altogether absurd to expect any single
judge to vie with an assemblage of law professors in the gamut of subjects,
ranging from accounting, administrative law and admiralty to water rights,
wills and world law, that may come before his court. Even the most experi-
enced twentieth century judge, as he pirouettes among all these topics, must
often feel himself a proper target for Dr. Johnson's shaft-"It is not done
well; but you are surprised to find it done at all."2 If our legal system per-
mitted, would it not be wiser, in true Roman fashion, to leave the "law" to
be made by the masters who know, with the judge relegated to decision of
the particular case and that without precedential effect?
Cardozo himself told us, again at Yale, "More and more we are looking to
the scholar in his study, to the jurist rather than to the judge or lawyer, for
inspiration and for guidance."' 3 In the same lecture he paid tribute to the role
played by professors, without whose "critical labors" in law reviews and
treatises, in one notable instance "heresy, instead of dying out, would probably
have persisted, and even spread."' 4 If the judge had to look for aid "to the
scholar in his study" in 1924, when such staples of today's legal fare as in-
come tax and labor law and security regulation could have been contained
in very small bottles, aeronautical law was barely dreamed of "i and atomic
11. PORTALIS, TRONCHET, BIGoT-PREAmENEU & MALEVILLE, DISCOURS PRELIMINAIRE
IN LocRE, LA LEGISLATION DE LA FRANCE 257 (1827), quoted in VON MEHREN, THE CML
LAW SYSTEM 57-58 (1957). Compare FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 186-95 (1930).
For a much more ancient example, consider the intricate problems that arose with respect
to the apparently simple prescription of the Fourth Commandment, as outlined in GUIGNE-
BERT, LE MONDE JUIF VERS LE TEIPS DE JESUS 106-07 (1935).
12. BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 287 (Everyman's ed. 1925).
13. CARDozo, TIE GROWTH OF THE LAW 11 (1924).
14. Id. at 13-16.
15. Cardozo noted, with some wonder, that "Already there is a body of legal literature
that deals with the legal problems of the air." CAabozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 62 (1921). The "body" in 1921 was slender and it was, indeed, more "literature"
than law.
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energy law was not, how much more tempting is such resort today? There
is, indeed, a possibility that certain legal questions might receive different
answers at New Haven than at "another place" a hundred miles northeast;
but we scarcely require reminder that judges also disagree. Yet, with all his
appreciation of the role of the law professors in containing or suppressing
judicial heresy, Cardozo stopped far short of proposing that the making of law
be entrusted to those who had discerned the true doctrine, rather than the
judges who, but for their guidance, would have strayed from the road. I hope
it is something other than an instinct for job security that makes me believe
he would have taken the same view in the even more complex world of today
-and this apart from political practicality and the unfeasibility, under our
legal system, of divorcing the deciding from the law-making functions of the
judge.'
0
Still, question must persist how, in this age of specialization, we can safely
leave even the decision of cases, much less the making of law, to judges the
most experienced of whom can scarcely be masters of more than a few of the
subjects with which they deal. If political and other considerations preclude
turning over the lawmaking function to the law professor, does not the answer
lie in specialized courts? Quite clearly, it is such an understandable belief that
the law has outstripped the appellate judge that lies behind Dean Griswold's
advocacy of a special court for the final determination of all tax appeals save
those few involving constitutional issues,' 7 as well as the proposals for an
administrative court 18 and a special court for patent litigation.' 9 Yet that
16. Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HAv. L. REV. 940, 957 (1923) ; FaED-
MsfANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SocIErY 30 (1959).
17. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1153 (1944).
See the comments made by Mr. justice Douglas on the oral delivery of his dissent in Meyer
v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 210 (1960), N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1960, p. 29, col. 7. See also
Lowndes, Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT REvIEw 222
(1960) ("It is time to rescue the Supreme Court from federal taxation; it is time to rescue
federal taxation from the Supreme Court.").
18. See CoMISSlON ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERN-
MENT, LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 84-88 (1955). See, favoring the proposal, Caldwell,
The Proposed Federal Administrative Court: The Arguments for its Adoption, 36 A.B.
A.J. 13 (1950) ; opposing it, SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON
LAW WORLD 317-20 (1954). The proposal has now assumed the more modest form of a
Trade Court. S. 1275, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. A provocative remark is made in this connec-
tion by FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING Soc=IY 412 (1959):
Unless there is a drastic change in the training and experience of lawyers from
whom the judges are recruited, it is a matter of sheer accident if some of them,
through wartime government service, or some other public mission, have acquired
experience of the administrative process.
One wonders whether the process is truly so esoteric--or why practice before adminis-
trative agencies, as well as "wartime government service or some other public mission,"
cannot qualify.
19. See, opposing the proposal, Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The
Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A.J. 425 (1951).
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movement has not caught on; in the federal system only the Customs Court
and the Court of Military Appeals 20 can be deemed specialized in the full
sense that the subjects confided to them are largely withdrawn from the juris-
diction of the District Courts and the Courts of Appeals. Any further develop-
ment of such exclusive specialized courts seems likely to be in areas where a
separate language is required-tax law, as it appears to some, because of the
intricacy of the legislation, or patents because of the increasingly technical
nature of some of the raw material. How can we explain this seeming satis-
faction with the system of general appellate courts,2 ' save perhaps in these few
specialties, at a time when the law would appear to have outrun the judges?
We can find the beginning of a clue to this paradox in a passage of the
Storrs lectures where Cardozo analyzes the grist of an appellate court. A
majority of the cases that came before his court, he tells us, "could not, with
semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one," since "the law and its
application alike are plain"; "in another and considerable percentage, the rule
of law is certain, and the application alone doubtful. '22 In these two large
areas, which Cardozo later estimated to comprise at least nine-tenths of the
cases decided by appellate courts, 23 the process is more important than the
subject matter; and the judge can lay claim to being a specialist in that. He
will have acquired the power of analysis, of determining the issues--often
quite other than what the parties think these to be. He will have learned to
heed the imperative of going to the sources; experience will have taught him,
if wisdom has not, never to rely on a characterization or on memory of what
a witness has testified, a document stated, an opinion ruled, a statute com-
manded. He knows how to find these sources with speed and accuracy, and
how to deal with them once they have been found. He understands how to
pick evidence apart, to determine the inferences that may reasonably be drawn,
to weigh one piece of testimony against another. He will have acquired some
skill in the understanding of decisions and their precedential value; he will
have learned something also about the reading of statutes. He will have
trained himself to test his conclusions by essaying to put them in writing, and
to express them fairly, clearly, and cogently. In the use of these tools, indis-
pensable in all cases, sufficient in those where "the law and its application
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340, 2631-42 (1958) ; 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1958).
21. ".... it still seems to me that increasingly as technological complexity piles high,
our ancient institution of ultimate review by those complete nonspecialists, the gen-
eral Supreme Court, stands out as one of the wisest institutions man has thus far
managed to develop."
LLEWELLYN, THE COmmoN LAW TRAnrrioN: DECIDING APPEALS 333-34 (1960).
22. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDCIAL PROCESS 164 (1921).
23. CAuozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 60 (1924). Indeed, Cardozo's nine-tenths
estimate probably should be read as referring to the first category alone. Thus reading it.
Professor Harry W. Jones finds it "surprising" on the high side. Jones, Law and Morality
in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61 COLum. L. Rav. 799, 803 n.16 (1961). So would
I. If it includes both categories, I would not.
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alike are plain" and in most where "the rule of law is certain, and the appli-
cation alone is doubtful," he has acquired specialized competence, and he is
none the worse-indeed, he is much the better-for sharpening his skills on
a variety of grindstones.2
What then of the residue of appellate cases, what Cardozo called the judge's
"serious business," 25 "where a decision one way or the other, will count for
the future, will advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes little, the
development of the law" ?26 Here one saving factor for the necessarily un-
specialized appellate judge is that the odds heavily favor the little against the
much. Precedents will already have gone a great part of the way-the decision
will be whether to press them further or refuse, whether to follow a line of
authority emanating from one policy or a different line deriving from another.
It is impossible to avoid quoting at this point Holmes' familiar phrase that
judges legislate "only interstitially; they are confined from molar to mole-
cular motions. 2'27 Even MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 2 8 had its predeces-
sors and could hardly have been decided without them.29 Cardozo extended
liability without "privity," first to the automobile manufacturer in the Mac-
Pherson case and then to the public weigher in Glanzer v. Shepard,30 but
when it came to imposing the broad liability on accountants proposed in
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.,31 he thought the time had come
for judges to stop and elected lawmakers to begin-as within two years, in a
measure, they did.32 Rare, indeed, is the complete turnabout such as Erie R.
R. v. Tompkins 3 -- fortunately so since the courts are still endeavoring,
twenty-three years later, to plumb all that was there decided,34 and, I dare
say, will be engaged in that same pursuit twenty-three years hence.
The inevitable lack of expertise by judicial lawmakers does not seem to me
unduly disturbing so long as the web is woven in small knots. What does
24. Compare the advice of Lord Acton in his Inaugural Lecture on the Study of His-
tory, reprinted in LEcTuREs ON MODERN HISTORY 30 (1961), and in EssAys ON FREEDOM
AND POWER 39-40 (1955).
25. CARDozo, TE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 21 (1921).
26. Id. at 165.
27. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917).
28. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
29. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADIToN: DECIDING APPEALs 431-37
(1960).
30. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
31. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See LEVY, CARnozo AND FRONTIERs OF LEGAL
THINKING 43 (1938). In England the development stopped far short of Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche, Niven & Co. See Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164.
32. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 48 Stat. 82, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958).
33. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). True, there had been rumblings of discontent in dissenting
opinions, notably of Mr. Justice Holmes, and perhaps the initiated would have found a
premonition in Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U.S.
335 (1934), but the decision was surely a surprise to all but the most sophisticated, even
including one of the concurring justices. See MAsoN, HuLrN FIsKE STONE 476-81 (1956).
34. For a recent example, see Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d
Cir. 1960).
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disturb me are the occasions when the judge is confronted with the necessity
of leaping across the loom, particularly when he is confronted with a question
for which accepted judicial techniques afford no satisfactory answer. Let me
try to illustrate the distinction by two troublesome cases, both from Cardozo's
third category, recently decided by our Court.
The first is Carabellese v. Naviera Aznar, S.A.3 The question, as put to
us, was whether the shipowner's liability for injury to seamen arising from
unseaworthiness covers dangerous characteristics in cargo about to be stowed
-"whether the owner warrants to longshoremen not simply a safe place to
handle cargo but cargo which is safe to handle." Competing precedents and
principles were at play. The wave of unseaworthiness had advanced from
known defects in the vessel to unknown,36 and from the vessel's own gear to
gear brought aboard by others ;37 plainly it included improper stowage al-
ready effected.38 On the other side was the principle of tort law that the owner
of property is not usually liable for an accident caused solely by the negli-
gence of an independent contractor carefully selected.39 Even as the question
has been stated, its decision either way would not have taken us far from the
comfortable support of assured doctrine; but we did not decide even that. We
found there was no substantial evidence that the particular cargo could not
have been loaded by the taking of reasonable precautions by the stevedore
and held that in such a case the owner was not to be cast for unseaworthiness
merely because the loading required the stevedore to use somewhat more care
than in the usual case. We reserved judgment on the situation where the in-
jury resulted from a hidden danger in the cargo of which the stevedore was
not aware. Time alone will tell whether we rightly decided even the limited
issue that we did decide; at least the area of choice was small enough that we
could see where we were going. Of course, I am not unaware that the case
presented policy considerations beyond those articulated thus far. Presumably
there would be no absolute liability of the ship or her owner if the cargo had
injured the longshoreman on the pier ;40 why should the result be different
because the injury was on the ship if there was no respect in which the ship
35. 285 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1960).
36. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
37. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954) ; Rogers v. United States Lines,
347 U.S. 984 (1954).
38. Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd on other
grounds, Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); Amador
v. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, 224 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 901
(1955) ; Gindville v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 224 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1955); Reddick
v. McAllister Lighterage Line, Inc., 258 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1958).
39. P-ESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 409 (1934) ; 2 HARPER & JAIEs, TORTS § 26.11 (1956).
40. I am assuming that 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1958), extending ad-
miralty jurisdiction to include "all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused
by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or
consummated on land," would not cover such a case. Cf. Fredericks v. American Export
Lines, 227 F.2d 450, 454 (2d Cir. 1955).
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herself was unseaworthy? Even for an accident on the ship, ought not some
scope be left to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act?41 As against this, is there any real justification for distinguishing, as
regards the ship's liability, between the fall of a crate being loaded and the
fall of a crate that had already been? Or, to take a still broader view, has not
the Supreme Court gone so far down the road to absolute liability for injuries
aboard ship to seamen or persons performing seamen's work that lower courts
ought assume the remaining distance will be soon traversed?2 I do not as-
sert that the answer to these questions is easy; my point is that such con-
siderations are within the grasp even of the generalist, whether or not they
were here correctly weighed.
Another reason why we can tolerate law-making by nonspecialist judges in
such a case is that if a decision is wrong, the harm doge to the law, as dis-
tinguished from that to the parties, cannot be very great. An erroneous ad-
vance or retreat of an inch will do less damage than one of a foot and im-
measurably less than one of a yard, even if it endures. In fact, it is unlikely
to do so. Usually it will simply disappear--often quite quickly-under the
erosion of distinction or oblivion; there will be no need for the traumatic
process of overruling and establishing a principle altogether new. "The good"
in a judge's work, Cardozo told us, "remains the foundation on which new
structures will be built. The bad will be rejected and cast off in the laboratory
of the years."' 43 This is not only cheering news for the neophyte; it makes
judicial law-making tolerable so long as that process is confined to "inter-
stitial" legislation.
Let me cite in contrast a case where, it seems to me, the issue that had to
be decided was not one adapted to the techniques of judicial law making-
McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co.4 4 The issue was
whether, in a personal injury action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, the jury should be instructed to make a deduction, from the portion of
the award representing loss of earning power, for the income taxes the plain-
tiff would have had to pay on the lost earnings. The precedents in our own
Court were conflicting, with two cases pointing in opposite directions but with
the second not overruling the first.45 In the second case the governing law
was that of Oklahoma, and we reconciled the two by holding that was what
the Court had there applied. The decisions in other jurisdictions were divid-
ed.40 The legal principles invoked by the two sides-for the defendant that
41. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958).
42. See Halecki v. United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 358
U.S. 613 (1959) ; Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
43. CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 178 (1921).
44. 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1961).
45. Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944); O'Connor v. United
States, 269 F.2d 578, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1959).
46. The cases are collected in Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and
the Federal Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.AJ. 274, 276 n,19 (1960). The leading case for the
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damages are intended to make a plaintiff whole but no more,47 for the plain-
tiff that a recovery is not to be reduced for benefits from "collateral sources"S4
-were so far away that resort to them would have been rationalization rather
than reasoning-the lines of force were too remote to exert any real pull.
Here was a case where, of Cardozo's various methods of decision, only "the
method of sociology ' 49 was available; the problem was of the broad sort nor-
mally dealt with by elected legislators and the Court had in effect to act as
such. Since logic and philosophy afforded no aid, it is not surprising that the
result was lacking in them. Looking at the great mass of personal injury
cases, of which this one was typical, we held that the administrative problems
of income tax determination by juries or even by judges, plus the tendency
to under-compensation arising from inflation and from the inability of plain-
tiffs to recover their attorneys' fees,50 rendered the proposed instruction im-
proper. If we had stopped there, we would have been on ground that could
not be attacked as illogical, whether or not one thought it wise. However, the
case of the very large earner was pressed upon us. How absurd to present a
plaintiff with an award based on annual earnings of $100,000 when his effec-
tive income would have been less than half! We said therefore that at some
point in the income scale the balance of interests between plaintiff and de-
fendant would shift; later decisions will have to determine that point's loca-
tion more precisely and also how the deduction in the case of the large earner
shall be determined. I would hope, although I confess without much real
expectation, that before the courts have to do this, the legislature will step in.
The reason why I think McWeeney's case was inappropriate for judicial
solution is not so much that the precedents afforded no guidance-judges in
a tradition that decided Slade's case 51 and introduced the action for money
had and received into the common law would hardly cavil at that. The more
important reasons are that we lacked the factual data needed for a right an-
swer and, still worse, there was no right answer we could give even if the
data had been available. Let me explain.
A judge desiring to make a truly intelligent answer to the question posed
in McWeeney's case would need to know much more of what takes place in
the jury room than courts have yet learned-although some light from the
Middle West, in the shape of the University of Chicago jury study, may not
deduction is British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley, 3 All E.R. 796 (1955)-where the tax
would have amounted to nearly three-quarters of the earnings. For an interesting discus-
sion of the refusal of the Supreme Court of Israel, which had adopted the contrary rule
earlier laid down by the Court of Appeal, to follow the overruling by the House of Lords,
see International Lawyers' Convention in Israel 46, 297, 314-15 (1959).
47. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 25.1 (1956) ; McCoRmcx, DAMAGES § 20 (1935).
48. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 25.8, at 1316, § 25.10, at 1320-21, § 25.19, at 1337-41
(1956).
49. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-102 (1921).
50. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 872-78 (1929).
$1. 4 Coke 92b (1602).
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be far away. Also, I should think, he would have to know much else. He
would wish to know how much of the verdicts go for attorneys' fees and other
expenses of litigation, what plaintiffs do with the sums awarded, and whether
the lump sum recovery, determined in advance of the fact on the basis of
averages, is still suitable, especially in an age of new cures that may make it
too high, and of increased longevity and inflation which may make it too
low.5 2 But when all this information was at hand, judges still would not be
able to give a good answer to the question presented. A court has only three
choices-to deduct the tax in all cases, to deduct it in none, or to deduct it in
the big income cases but not in the medium or small. The last course, which
we adopted, was satisfactory only in the limited sense of seeming better than
either of the others, but it leaves future problems of drawing the line, and of
determining the tax in cases beyond the line, which courts are ill equipped to
handle.
Contrast the resources available to the legislature. The legislature might
establish a small-or no-percentage deduction on awards up to a certain
annual figure, and a higher percentage on those above. In fixing these per-
centages, it could determine whether they should reflect the under-compensa-
tion from probable future inflation or from the lack of recovery of attorney's
fees and, if so, to what degree. Percentage deductions thus determined could
apply regardless of idiosyncracies of the particular plaintiff in the way of ex-
emptions, deductions or outside income, and hence would free the courts from
the burden of inquiry about these in every case. Alternatively, the legislature
might decide to require the portion of the award representing loss of earnings,
or so much of it as was left after deducting expenses of litigation, to be paid
into court and disbursed over a period of years, then being subject to income
52. The lack of such information illustrates one difficulty I find in the "Two-Level
Procedure of Justification," recently proposed in the interesting little book: WASSERSTROM,
THE JUDIcIA.L DEcIsioN-TOwARn A THEORY OF LEGAL JUsTiFIcATION (1961). The two
levels are, first, selection of what would be generally regarded as the governing legal rule,
and, second, determination whether that rule produces as sociologically good a result as a
possible variant. (Presumably the "second-level" procedure would be used alone when, as
in McWeeney, there was fair room for doubt whether any precedentially created rule
existed). Taking as an example the marital evidentiary privilege and particularly its ap-
plication in the rather extraordinary case of Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958)
(cf. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960)) the author suggests at page 155, that
a court might approach the "second-level" problem by examining data as to the relative
frequency of divorces in "reasonably comparable" jurisdictions granting and not granting
the marital privilege. Apart from the fact that many critics of Hawkins v. United States
do not propose complete abolition of the privilege, and the questionable major premise that
marriage is always good and divorce bad, whence is such information to come-let alone
the far more complex data needed for a case like McWeeney's? See FRAN FURTER, Soa-E
OSERVATIONS ON SUPRFmE COURT LTriGATION AND LEGAL EDUCATION 17 (1954) ; Karst,
Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, in THE SuPREME COURT REV W 75 (1960).
I fear that, at least so long as decision is left to the courts rather than to bodies that can
command special studies, we shall have to be satisfied with much less "scientific!' solution
at the "second-level," along lines indicated in section III of this article.
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tax, and thereby end the whole problem. Almost any of these solutions would
be better than the best a court can achieve.
The moral is pointed out by the English experience with the related ques-
tion of the effect, in personal injury cases, of benefits receivable under the
national insurance scheme. After much investigation, Parliament enacted the
Law Reform (Personal Injuries) act, 1948, section 2(1) of which provides
that in an action for damages for personal injuries there shall be taken into
account against any loss of earnings or profits half the value of any rights in
respect of national security benefits for five years from the time when the
cause of action accrued. No judge could have arrived at a solution so Solo-
monic .53 Yet who is to say that it is not wiser than a court's universal yea
or nay?
Cardozo told us what we must do if we are to maintain our system of
judge-made law amid the growing complexities of twentieth century life. I
refer to his "A Ministry of Justice." 4 "Fiction and equity" were not always
enough, even in hands as skillful as his; the "thousandfold" multiplication of
power supplied by legislation was required. If that was needed when Cardozo
wrote, it is needed a vnulto fortiori in the super-sonic age. It is needed not
merely "to extirpate, root and branch, a rule which is today an incumbrance
and a snare" ;5 it is demanded, perhaps even more, to guide the courts in
areas where the legislature has furnished too uncertain a trumpet " and to
deal with problems where the range of choice has become too great for judges
to decide with wisdom and there may be need for a solution framed in some-
thing other than what the traditional judicial approach can attain. The il'c-
Weeney problem would not have been serious if the rate of income taxation
were a uniform 5 per cent; it is quite another matter with a 20 per cent with-
holding and rates ranging up to 91 per cent. Again, one need not altogether
accept Gray's thesis that "the law with regard to a natural force cannot exist
before the discovery of the force," 7 in order to agree that the law of common
callings, which has been traced back to the reign of Edward III, 8 may have
53. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 155 (1959).
54. 35 HARV. L. REv. 113 (1921), reprinted in CARADoZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 41
(1931). As to the superior resources available to the legislature, see also Mr. Justice Har-
lan, dissenting in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 362 U.S. 539, 572-73 (1960).
55. Id. at 51-52.
56. See, e.g., GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 10-13, at 677 (1957):
The Limitation Act has been due for a general overhaul for the past seventy-five
years; seventy-five years from now that statement will be still true, except that the
overhaul will then be one hundred and fifty years overdue.
Another example is what would seem the relatively passionless subject of enforcement of
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. See United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426
(1949) ; United States v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 276 F.2d 525, 538-43 (2d Cir. 1960).
Cf. United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 285 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 365
U.S. 857 (1961). Sometimes the legislative ambiguity is deliberate, see Cox, Reflections
upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1491 n.26 (1959).
57. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 99 (2d ed. 1921).
58. PLUcxNETT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 481-82.
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needed some modification for the iron horse and certainly for the flying one.
Aviation similarly requires legislation to deal with the basic problem of air
space; concepts developed when the sky was deemed to be "scraped" at five
hundred feet do not supply adequate answers when the air has become a high-
way both above and below that level. So likewise is legislation demanded for
the problems created by atomic energy, by heightened urbanizati6n, by the
intensification of our personal and business contacts with other nations, and
by many others. "We must have a courier who will carry the tidings of dis-
tress to those who are there to save when signals reach their ears" 59-and
not only will carry the message to the legislators but remain a gadfly until
something is done. Perhaps the best tribute that could be paid Cardozo on the
anniversary of his lectures would be to put that idea truly to work.
59a
IIL
The question how judges go about the business of judging continues to hold
interest-although apparently more for lawyers and law professors than for
judges. Llewellyn has told of promises by seven professors-made-judges "to
further their old, still fresh-scented job of helping prospective lawyers under-
stand how and why appellate judges decided as they did"--and of their dis-
tressing lack of performance. 60 He gives one clue to the failure of the experi-
ment by reference to William James' shrewd observation that "the completed
decision wipes off memory's slate most of the process of its attainment" ;61
psychiatrists would doubtless proffer another less flattering explanation. A
further reason is that the new judge soon learns that each judge judges dif-
ferently from every other judge and that any one judge judges differently in
each case. The subject is far too large and deep for treatment here. Still there
may be some value in setting down a few initial and provisional thoughts.
Today, particularly after Llewellyn's provocative study, we are a long way
from some of the more excessive realist outbursts, such as the characteriza-
tion of decision as "an emotive experience in which principles and logic play
a secondary part. '6 2 Few would now accept even the testimony, given many
years ago by a most distinguished judge, that cases are decided by a "hunch,"
if that means only "an intuitive sense of what is right or wrong for that
59. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 42 (1931).
59a. Since this was written, Dean Griswold has pertinently said,
Forty years ago this fall Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo made his cry for a Ministry
of Justice. The opening sentence was: "The courts are not helped as they could and
ought to be in the adaptation of law to justice." And he closed by saying: "The time
is ripe for betterment." Everyone commented most favorably on this essay. Yet it is,
I am afraid, quite fair to say that absolutely nothing was done about it.
Harvard Law School, Dean's Report for 1960-61, p. 12.
60. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 29, at 264-65.
61. Id. at 104, citing 1 JAmES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 260 (1890).
62. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 480
(1928).
19611
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
cause" 63 or by a flash of romantic imagination "in which the meagre stale
forbidding ways of custom, law and statute . . ." are happily cast aside. This
is not to assert that all judges or any one judge will inevitably follow the
identical or, indeed, any describable logical process," or to deny that on occa-
sions a night's sleep or a morning's walk will suddenly produce what seems
clarity where all was confusion before. Ultimately some conclusion must
emerge, for it is "a judge's duty to decide, not to debate." 65 The point is that
the conclusion which flashes before the shaving-mirror in the morning does
not differ in intellectual quality from that matured from study in chambers
the night before; each represents a synthesis of the ways "of custom, law and
statute"-not "stale" and "forbidding" but fresh and inviting-with the
judge's years of experience and days of reflection. An important ingredient
omitted from what Judge Hutcheson wrote, although doubtless included in
what he meant, is that what he called intuition is not free but trained; Dean
Pound put it more accurately when he said: "The trained intuition of the
judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give
unimpeachable legal reasons." 6
Today's major debate seems to lie in a somewhat different area. How far
are appellate decisions "result-oriented"? How far may they permissibly be?
A passage from a recent comment by Dean Griswold furnishes a useful
springboard for discussion:
Intellectual disinterestedness in a judge is a pearl of very great price,
achieved only by continual care and striving. Even the greatest some-
times succumb. For example, Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, and
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, both opinions by Justice Brandeis, have always
seemed to me to be strongly result-oriented decisions. But to say that
shaping the opinion to the result is hard to avoid, and that it has been
done by the best, is only to emphasize the difficulties involved and the
importance of constant effort to see that decisions are really reached, as
far as humanly possible, on intellectually valid and disinterested
grounds.
67
63. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decisions, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285 (1929). This article received strong endorsement in
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 103-04 (1930).
64. Pound pointed this out many years ago in The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36
HARy. L. Rrv. 940, 951 (1923).
65. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIERTY 100 (1952).
66. Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REv. 940, 951 (1923). Even
Pound's statement is criticized, as over-emphasizing the role of "intuition," in NVASsER-
STROM, op. cit. supra note 52, at 103. Very likely this whole dispute over "intuition" is
largely semantic. I am more troubled by Judge Hutcheson's reference to "what is right or
wrong in the particular case" rather than in the general situation of which the case is an
instance. See Wasserstrom's criticism, id. at 91-98, and many of the comments in LLEwEL-
LYN, op. cit. supra note 29.
67. Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV.
L. REv. 81, 91 (1960).
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I assume that when Dean Griswold used the phrase "result-orientation" in
this pejorative sense, he did not mean merely some consideration of the rela-
tive desirability of the result of one decision or another. That is Cardozo's
"method of sociology,"'68 and no one to my knowledge, and surely not Dean
Griswold, has ever questioned Cardozo's disinterestedness. "Result-orienta-
tion" in the sense condemned must thus refer to a judge's personal belief in
what is desirable, formed before study of the case at hand and resistant to
contrary argument.
Bad as all this may sound, to condemn it semper et ubique is to put the
criticism on the wrong ground. The way to handle this kind of "result-orienta-
tion" is to require that a judge keep his personal beliefs as to desirability in
their appropriate subordinate place in the judicial process-not to insist on
his pretending to an intellectual equilibrium on great policy matters that can-
not be expected or, in many instances, desired. No one recognized the imprac-
ticability of the latter more clearly than Cardozo. Although the judge ought to
"disengage himself, so far as possible, of every influence that comes from the
particular situation which is presented to him, and base his judicial decision
on elements of an objective nature," 69 nevertheless the judges "do not stand
aloof on... chill and distant heights; and we shall not help the cause of truth
by acting and speaking as if they do.' '70 Centuries earlier, Hobbes required
that the judge "diveste himself of all feare, anger, hatred, love and compas-
sion"71 but not of all conviction. To this limited extent I agree with some
of the thoughts Judge Arnold has so strongly expressed ;72 his error is in
making it appear that the judge will probably, and may permissibly, hold the
same deep-seated personal faith about the reorganization sections of the In-
ternal Revenue Code as about the First Amendment. Even as to questions
of the latter sort the judge should try to make sure he is interpreting the long
term convictions of the community rather than his own evanescent ones; but
we may as well recognize this goal will not always be realized even "by the
best." Sometimes the judge will fail of this because the community has no
true convictions-the people of the United States scarcely entertained any
common will as to Swift v. Tyson-on other occasions because it is asking too
much that a judge suppress the basic beliefs by which he lives. What seems
to me important is not to insist on a degree of detachment that often is
-unattainable and sometimes is undesirable,73 but to limit severely the cases
68. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-141 (1921).
69. Id. at 121.
70. Id. at 168.
71. LEviATHAN, ch. =xvi, in MORRIS, TE GREAT LEGAL PHI.OSOPHERS 130 (1959).
72. Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1298, 1312-13 (1960).
73. See Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27
U. CHI. L. REv. 66 (1960). As Professor Jaffe has well said,
Our tradition rightly interpreted is that the judge should be neutral toward the
question of whether the specific defendant is guilty. It is a perversion of that tradition
to demand that the judge be neutral toward the purpose of the law.
Jaffe, The Reform of Federal Administrative Procedure, 2 Pun. ADmiN. REv. 149 (1942).
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in which a judge may consult his views on such matters, to define the stage
in the judicial process when such considerations may enter and to what de-
gree. Again Cardozo can be our mentor, if we have the grace to listen.
Let us go back to Cardozo's three-fold division of the cases coming before
an appellate court. 74 "Result-orientation" in the sense condemned is scarcely
likely to enter into his first category, where "the law and its application alike
are plain"; all will agree it would be wholly intolerable if it did. In the
second, where the "rule of law is certain, and the application alone doubtful,"
there will scarcely be a hazard save when the whole bench shares the same
prejudices, and then more to the parties than to the law; but here again stric-
tures on "result-orientation" are amply deserved. The problem under discus-
sion is really encountered only when we reach Cardozo's third category-
those cases where the judge has some freedom to make a rule of law. Here
and here alone may a judge occasionally take his personal belief of the desir-
able into account; when and how much will vary greatly according to the
nature of the case. Some illustrations may place the problem in focus.
Take first a problem of statutory interpretation. Each side asserts, with
some degree of plausibility, that the words, taken simply as words, have a
meaning favorable to it. Such a problem is excruciating in its demand for
judicial objectivity. No one, to my knowledge, has described it so well as
Judge Learned Hand-the judge "must try as best he can to put into concrete
form what . . . [the common] will is, not by slavishly following the words,
but by trying honestly to say what was the underlying purpose expressed. ' ' 75
Only after all the processes incident to interpretation-intensive study of the
words, not only in themselves but in their relation to other parts of the statute
and in comparison with earlier and later statutes, of the problem the act was
intended to meet, of legislative history, and of practical construction-have
been tried and found in precise balance, as they rarely will be, may there be
consideration of the relative desirability of the two results. Even as to that,
"the judge must always remember that he should go no further than he is
sure the government would have gone, had it been faced with the case before
him. If he is in doubt, he must stop, for he cannot tell that the conflicting
interests in the society for which he speaks would have come to a just result,
even though he is sure that he knows what the just result should be,"'70 and
he must endeavor to puzzle out what the legislature would have deemed desir-
able, not what he would have thought. Attempt this he must; yet we cannot
reasonably expect that fallible humans will always be capable of selflessness so
sublime.
Let us take next a situation where there are no statutes but a line of prece-
dents that have almost but not quite reached the case in hand, with perhaps
some conflicting ones emerging on the other side. Since the judge is here mak-
74. See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
75. HAND, THE SpuT oIp LIBERTY 84 (1952).
76. Ibid.
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ing law, there is more reason for his considering the relative desirability of
the two results than when he is dealing with a statute. Yet here, too, the entry
of the desirability theme should be postponed. As Cardozo taught, the rule of
analogy or the method of philosophy, as he calls it, has "a certain presumption
in its favor . . . . It has the primacy that comes from natural and orderly
succession. Homage is due to it over every competing principle that is unable
by appeal to history or tradition or policy or justice to make out a better
right.' '77 In such a case, the judge will do exceeding well to keep judgment in
suspense and maintain his mind fully open to the view of colleagues, as Pro-
fessor Henry Hart and Dean Griswold have urged,78 before he turns to con-
siderations of "policy or justice," and when he does that, he should attempt to
apprehend the community's views, not his own, but we may as well recognize
that, in fact, the views embodied in decision will be more likely to have
emerged from the judge's previous experience and reflection than from new
research painstakingly conducted in an aseptic social laboratory3
9
Let us turn finally to the two opinions where Dean Griswold thinks Mr.
Justice Brandeis "succumbed." I do not disagree with the Dean's condemna-
tion of Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n,80 although I am not sure our
condemnation rests on precisely the same ground. I do not think it was wrong
that Brandeis, having formed the strong view that courts ought to decide
actual and not hypothetical controversies, 81 and believing that "the most im-
portant thing we do is not doing," 82 should not consider this view open to re-
examination in every case; what was wrong about Willing was that Brandeis'
zeal for this position prevented him from looking fairly at what was actual and
what hypothetical as he later did,83 and also led him to violate his own maxim
by deciding something not remotely presented for decision. Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins 84 was an altogether different matter. I do not question Dean Gris-
wold's assumption as to the facts. Having served as the Justice's law clerk the
year Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co.8s came before the Court, I have little doubt he was waiting
for an opportunity to give Swift v. Tyson 8 6 the happy despatch he thought
77. CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 31-32 (1921).
78. Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HA~v. L. REv. 84, 100 (1959) ; Gris-
wold, supra note 67, at 85.
79. See note 52 supra.
80. 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
81. See his unpublished opinion in the Atherton Mills case in BIcKEL, THE UNPUB-
LISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 5-14 (1957).
82. Id. at 17.
83. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), in which Brandeis con-
curred.
84. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
85. 276 U.S. 518 (1928). Those who read footnotes will doubtless have seen that this
was also the term of Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
86. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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it deserved. I am willing to assume also that even though new research on the
history of section 34 of the judiciary Act 87 provided ample ground for re-
versal and the Constitution itself was ultimately invoked, 88 the true motive for
decision was the Justice's belief that the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson contained
"defects, political and social" and produced "mischievous results" -and that
no amount of argument could have led him to think otherwise.8 9 I part com-
pany with the Dean only in the conclusion that this showed a lack of "intel-
lectual disinterestedness." The question at issue was of the most fundamental
character, going to the very nature of the Federal union; Brandeis had been
pondering it for at least a decade and probably much longer; and I see nothing
wrong in his adhering to a conclusion so formed rather than making a pre-
tense of reexamination either in the discussion leading to the opinion or by
granting a reargument in which counsel could not have added anything to
what the various Justices themselves had urged. I would say the same with
respect to another "result-oriented" decision of Mr. Justice Brandeis of which
I have some personal knowledge, his dissent in the wire-tapping case, Olin-
stead v. United States.90 Here his thinking went back not ten years, but
nearly forty-to the article on "The Right to Privacy" written in 1890 for the
Harvard Law Review with his partner Warren ;91 it is altogether idle to sup-
pose that, on such an issue, any quantity of argument would-or should-have
altered a position so long and so deeply held.
Let not my defense of Brandeis' handling of these two cases obscure or
weaken what I have said before. The cases where an appellate judge may
properly be affected by consideration of the desirability of the result are a
fraction of the category, itself a relatively small fraction of the decisions he
will have to make, where a new rule of law must be forged. The rule must be
the desirable one for the situation, not for the idiosyncracies of the particular
parties. Even after all this he should do his level best to eliminate purely per-
sonal views of the desirable. But in some cases the best of judges will not
succeed in that and in a few, a very few, it is wrong to expect them to try.
I would not altogether ban this medicine of personal belief-indeed, we could
not effectively ban it if we would, so long as the bench is occupied by human
beings rather than Univacs-but it must be prescribed rarely and then with
restraint. In those few cases where the prescription is appropriate, it betrays
no lack of disinterestedness that the judge does not go through the form of
reexamining the efficacy of every element in the pharmacopoeia.
87. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV.
L. REv. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923).
88. See MASON, HARLAN Fis.E STONE 478-80 (1956).
89. 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
90. 277 U.S. 438, 483 (1928).
91. Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 195, 205 (1890). See
Freund in MR. JusTIcE 116-17 (Dunham & Kurland ed. 1956).
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IV.
"Le droit A ses 6poques," said Pascal, as Cardozo recalled for us.9 2 Indubi-
tably Cardozo's epoch was one of greatness, which he helped make all the
greater-as Dean Pound has said, "a time of transition, quite comparable to
the formative era of American law, a time when judges are called upon to
shape the legal materials which took form for nineteenth-century America to
the exigencies of the economically unified, urban, industrial America of the
twentieth century."0 3 It is not hard to locate the seed-time of this greatness-
the young Eliot's call of Langdell to the deanship of the Harvard Law School
in 1870, followed by the appointments of Thayer and Ames in 1873 and
Holmes' lectures on "The Common Law" in 1881. Did Cardozo's death in
1938 coincide with the beginning of a downward slope?
A good case can be made that it did. It seems not altogether a hankering
for the snows of yesteryear that makes a graduate of the late '20s think the
counters show a somewhat lower champagne content in today's legal air than
in those days when bliss it was to be alive. Nor is objective confirmation
wanting. Of the three other great judges who, along with Cardozo, dominated
the era, Holmes retired in 1932 and Brandeis early in 1939, although Judge
Learned Hand, to our great good fortune, remained with us, active and pro-
ductive to the very end, until this past summer. It is in no way denigrating
their many able successors to say that none has had quite the stature of these
four mighty men.04 Bohlen wrote in 1930 that "during the last five years
American Courts have made great strides in the development and analysis
of the law of Torts";95 would anyone say as much today? For contracts,
Wood v. Duff-Gordon 96 was decided in 1917; for the law of fiduciaries, Mein-
hard v. Salmon 'I in 1928. In constitutional law, Mr. Justice Holmes' Loch-
ner dissent 9s goes back to 1905, the "Brandeis brief" to 1908.99 We are like-
ly to think the use of federal habeas corpus for the protection of those con-
victed of crime through abuse of constitutional guarantees to be a major de-
velopment of our day; but Johnson v. Zerbst 10 0 was decided the year Cardozo
died, and had been prefigured, as regards state convictions, by Moore v.
92. CARnozo, LAW AND Lrrm Etu 68-69 (1931).
93. Pound, Foreword to PoLLA"e, MR. JusTIcE CA nozo: A LBERA MIND IN AcTION
4 (1935). See also Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REv. 641 (1923).
94. Note Professor Jones' recent reference to "Cardozo, Holmes' only equal as an
American common law judge." Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal
Realism, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 799, 803 (1961), and the Manchester Guardian's recent obit-
uary:
There are many who will feel that with the death of Learned Hand the golden age
of the American judiciary has come to an end.
95. BOELEN, CASES ON TORTS iii (3d ed. 1930).
96. 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
97. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
98. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905).
99. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908).
100. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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Dempsey 101 and Mooney v. Holohan'0 2 some years before. Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins 1o3 was likewise decided in 1938 and the only really major develop-
ment of the doctrine, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 0 4 came but seven years later. Against the galaxy of these and
many other decisions, what of like importance have recent years of Supreme
Court decision offered, with the solitary exception of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation ?1o5 Then add the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which became effec-
tive in 1938, the greatest of the many contributions to our law by the then
Dean of the Yale Law School, Judge Charles E. Clark.
Other data yield a similar conclusion. The years ending with Cardozo's
death were the years of the great treatises. Williston on Contracts was pub-
101. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
102. 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935).
103. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
104. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
105. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The editors have suggested that I ought to add Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). If that decision has the effect of imposing on the states the
precise Federal implementation of the Bill of Rights, thereby overruling or impairing sub
silentio such cases as Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78 (1908), Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and Adamson v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), I should agree. But Mr. Justice Clark's prevailing opinion, for
four Justices, does not say that, and, especially in view of the limited nature of Mr. Justice
Black's concurrence and of the recent reiteration of Twining v. New Jersey in Cohen v.
Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 127-29 (1961), I would think it quite premature to suppose the
decision goes anything like that far; only time will tell how far it does. For an interesting
discussion, antedating Mapp, see the Madison lecture by Mr. Justice Brennan, The Bill of
Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 761 (1961).
It may be worth recording that, in what was fated to be my last talk with Judge
Learned Hand, I expressed concern over the size of the problem Mapp had created, initial-
ly for state courts and ultimately for Federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958), in the
form of applications by prisoners who would now "discover" they had been convicted,
many years back, by evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure. It seemed to me
altogether likely that most of these applications would be unmeritorious as to the fact of
illegal search and seizure, and that, in many of the small fraction that might have merit
on that score, the prisoner would have been convicted in any event; yet the hearing of
these myriad complaints would further disable the courts, already overburdened, from
performing pressing duties to more worthy litigants. Hence I suggested that if the majority
was intent on overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ; it should have done so on
a prospective basis, applying the new rule only to trials occurring thereafter or, at the
most, to Mapp and all other cases where the process of direct appeal had not yet been con-
cluded, as distinguished from convictions that had become final, the course proposed by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in a not dissimilar context, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25-26 (1956).
Compare Mr. Justice Black dissenting in Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1951),
and see generally Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (1960). judge Hand vehemently dissented, but with the kind of gay ferocity that
always left one uncertain how far his professed disagreement represented true conviction
and how far the love of the lively legal argument-even at 89. Perhaps my concern was ill-
founded; a lower New York court has just held that Mapp was intended to apply only
prospectively, People v. Figueroa, N.Y. County Court, Kings County, 30 U.S.L. WEil
2158.
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lished in 1920-24; the first edition of Williston on Sales goes back to 1909.
The three editions of Wigmore on Evidence are dated 1904, 1923, and 1939;
Scott on Trusts also came in 1939. Nor were the first four decades wanting
in books more fundamental in character-in addition to Cardozo's own. Gray's
Nature and Sources of the Law was published in 1909, Pound's Introduction
to the Philosophy of Law and The Spirit of the Common Law appeared in
1921, and his Interpretations of Legal History and Hohfeld's Fundamental
Legal Conceptions in 1923-its principal chapter having appeared a decade
before. 10 These also were the years of the Restatements, in which Cardozo
took so deep an interest. 0 7 The first of these, on Contracts, appeared in 1932;
others followed at brief intervals thereafter; and the last, the final volumes of
Property, were published in 1945. All the while the law reviews were pouring
forth a stream of pioneering articles by such men as Stone, Frankfurter, T. R.
Powell, Morgan, Cook, Lorenzen, Bohlen, Seavey and Chafee, to name only
a few. Great new treatises we have today, indeed, such as Corbin on Con-
tracts, Mertens on Federal Income and Federal Gift and Estate Taxation,
Moore on Federal Practice, Davis' Administrative Law Treatise, and Loss on
Securities Regulation ;10 but, although written in the grand manner, all but
the first lie for the most part in fields largely occupied by statute or rule and
can hardly organize a subject as Williston did for contracts or Wigmore for
evidence. And the Restatements, valuable though they assuredly will be, can
scarcely create the same interest, or make the same contribution, as their
predecessors.
Assuming that the fifth and sixth decades of the century have seen some-
what less dramatic development of law by judges and others than the first
four, what are the causes and the portents? Great creative eras cannot be ex-
pected to last forever. "Periods of judicial boldness in the adaptation of the
law to new social problems have usually been followed by periods of consoli-
dation and reaction." 10 9 If the work has been well done, there must be an in-
terval before new creation is needed-or possible. No tears are shed because
the sons of J. S. Bach, great composers though they were, did not equal the
father; some years had to pass and new thoughts to be developed, in part by
them, before there was need for a Mozart to give these definitive expression.
The increase in the role of legislation has doubtless played a large part in the
detente. Interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act does not provide the
same intellectual excitement as the Long Island Railroad's liability to Mrs.
Palsgraf for the dislodgement of the package of firecrackers from the arms of
the unnamed prospective passenger, 110 although it is immensely more impor-
106. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
107. See, e.g., CARIozo, LAw AND LITERATURE 121-41 (1931).
108. How one would like to be able to add treatises of similar excellence on labor and
antitrust law 1
109. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SocmEY 28 (1959).
110. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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tant in day-to-day life. If it is thus hard today to recapture all the stimulation
of the golden age, there is surely no need for the judge, or the law student,
to believe we have passed into not merely a silver but a copper one. Problems
still press for solution, ranging from the very old ones of reformulating per-
sonal injury and criminal law, through such great new fields as labor law, to
the altogether novel problem of developing the law of space."1 Solution for
most of these will call for action by elected legislators rather than judges;
indeed, many will require handling on supra-national lines. Meanwhile the
appellate judge will do well to remember another lesson from Cardozo's life.
As Llewellyn has reminded us, ". . . the beauty of Cardozo's judging did not
consist primarily in production of three dozen transcendent landmarks of Mliac-
Pherson stature. . . . As he grew more experienced, the drive grew in him
to leave the older authorities tidied up behind, to make each little opinion, in
its own little way, a clean fresh start. 11 2 Even though "the cabin of doctrine
may seem for the moment complete, with only chinks and leaks left to attend
to,"1 3 there is still much worthy work of this sort to be done-and there al-
ways will be.
111. See, e.g., Cooper, Fundamental Questions of Outer Space Law, a lecture pre-
sented at Leiden University, Oct. 10, 1960; American Bar Foundation, Report to the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration on the Law of Outer Space (1960).
112. LLEmVELLYN, op. cit. supra note 29, at 297-98.
113. Id. at 37.
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